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Committee Socialization in the 
U.S. House of Representatives 
JAMES L. Gurn 
Furman University 
INTRODUCTION 
Students of Congress have long been aware of informal norms or 
rules of behavior which are thought to be important for th e successful 
functioning of the legislative system and are regularly inculcated in new 
members of Congress. Donald R. Matthews, Ralph K. Huitt, Charles L. 
Clapp, ·and others have identifi ed apprenticeship, specialization, reci-
procity, hard work and legislative courtesy as key legislative norms .1 
More recently scholars have focused on "committee-specific" norms: 
values related to the functioning of particular Congressional committees. 
Richard Fenno's pioneering work on the House Appropriations Com-
mittee identified norms especially stressed within that panel: apprentice-
ship, hard work, unity, minimal partisanship. More recently, Fermo, 
John F. Manley, and other scholars have found a variety of norms, 
values, and "decision-rules" existing in several committees. 2 
Despite the attention paid these committee-specific norms, there 
has been little assessment of the impact these subsystem norms may have 
on the Congress as a whole. As Matthews and Stimson have noted, 
"service on at least the better integrated House committees tends to 
socialize the specialist into an overall committee point of view which 
may diverge from the views of Congress as a whole." 8 If this does 
1 Donald R. Matthews , U. S. Senators and Their World (New York: Random 
House, 1960); Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody, Congress: Two Decades of 
Analysis (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); Charles L. Clapp , The Congressman: 
His Work as He Sees It (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963); and, Herbert 
B. Asher, "The Leaming of Legislative Norms," American Political Science Review, 
68 ( June 1973), pp . 499-513. 
2 Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political 
System; The Problem of Integration," American Political Science Review, 56 (Jun e, 
1962), pp. 310-24; John F. Manley, "The House Committee on Ways and Means: 
Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee," American PoUtical Science 
Review, 59 (December , 1965), pp. 927-39; and, James T. Murphy, "Political Par-
ties and the Porkbarrel: Party Conflict and Cooperation in House Public Works 
Decision-Making," American Political Science Review, 68 (March, 1974), pp. 
169-85. 
s Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, "The Decision-Making Approach 
to the Study of Legislative Behavior," a paper delivered at the 65th Annual Meet-
ing of the American Political Science Association, 1969. Cited in Arthur G. Stephens, 
Jr., "Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955-70: The Democratic 
Study Group," American Political Science Review, 68 (June 1974) , p. 668. 
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occur, the legislative output of major committees may not reflect the 
distribution of opinion in th e House. In addition, these committee -
specific norms may be transferable to others contexts, i.e. the norms 
learned in committee may affect th e Congressman's entire legislative 
outlook, not simply work within his area of specialization. 4 
This paper is a preliminary investigation of the "carry-over" of 
committee norms into general voting behavior. The House Appropria-
tions and the Ways and Means Committees are compared on two some-
what contrasting norms held by their members. Changes in floor voting 
behavior of new members over a series of Congressional sessions ,are 
examined for evidence of socializing influence. Specifically, the paper 
will focus on the question of whether differing internal committee norms 
concerning partisanship and ideology affect Democratic members' voting 
behavior on the House floor. The choice of these two committees for 
study reflects several considerations: the centrality of both committees 
in Congress, the rather stabl e membership of both , the demonstrable 
persistence of a well-dev eloped system of norms within each, and the 
existence of a wealth of information on both panels. Since new members 
are typically added to both committees only after considerable House 
service, a baseline of voting behavior can be established, facilitating 
examination of changes resulting from protracted committee member-
ship and repeated exposure to committee norms and values. 
The Problem 
According to Fenno •and Manley, both Committ ees have been highly 
integrated bodies with fairly consistent sets of norms, inculcated in new 
members through elaborate socialization process. Various sanctions are 
used by committee leaders to encourage proper learning and discourage 
deviance from committee values and modes of operation. Although both 
possess effective mechanisms for socialization of new members, many of 
the specific no1ms taught are different. For example, in Appropriation s 
the norm of specialization and reciprocity among specialists is greatly 
emphasized; the Ways and Means Committee until very recently re-
warded generalized expertise. This contrast in norms undoubtedly re-
sulted in rather different internal decision-making modes. 6 
There rare ,also variations in two committee "folkways" which seem 
likely to have more generalized effects on members . The first involves 
4 Asher hints at the problem of whether norms learned in one context may be 
transferable to another. "The Learning of Legislative Norms," p. 513. 
5 Richard F. Fenno, The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Con-
gress (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.), pp. 161-163, and, John F. Manley, The 
Politics of Finance (Boston: Little , Brown and Company , 1970), pp. 94-95 
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political or ideology. Fenno discovered a complex of Appropriation Com-
mittee norms which emphasize fiscal and economic conservatism: the 
necessity of cutting the Federal budget , protecti ng the Treasury, and 
guarding the power of the purse. Despite the persistent efforts of Demo-
cratic leaders to "pack" Appropriations with liberal Democrats , the 
Committee atmosphere usually triggered a conservative reaction by 
these new members. On the basis of interviews , Fenno argued that 
"within one or two terms, Democratic liberals -are differentiating be-
tween themselves ,and the 'wild-eyed spenders' or the 'free spenders' in 
the House." Republicans, appointed to the Committee becaus e of their 
"fiscally responsible" attitudes, find their conservatism reinforced}' The 
Ways and Means Committee exhibits a different set of values. As on 
Appropriations, new Democratic members are usually added on the 
basis of their liberal credentials. Unlike Appropriations, however , the 
dominant internal ethos of Ways and Means does not emphasize shin-
gent conservatism, but rather "responsible," "moderate," and "pragmatic" 
liberalism among Democrats and similarly restrained Republican con-
servatism. Although many observers have felt that the resultant mix 
produc ed a "standpat" bias, Ways and Means has been less emphat-
ically conservative than Approp riations. The socialization process within 
the Committee may impart a conservative bias, but if so, it should be 
less obvious than that of Appropriations. 7 
A second important normative difference between the two Com-
mittees involves partisanship. A vital feature of the Appropriations Com-
mittee, according to Fenno, is the norm of "minimal partisanship." 
Although members with high degrees of party loyalty are appointed on 
both sides, the Committee's mode of operation emphasizes subordinat-
ing party considerations to the central values of budget-cutting and 
economy, a rule of behavior which obviously creates the great est strain 
for Northern Democrats. Ways and Means is considerably different; 
Manley observed that its central norm has been "restricted partisan-
ship," party regularity moderated by good interparty personal relation-
ships and overall businesslike conduct of the Committee's work. Given 
these rather different limits on the degree of permissible partisanship, 
one might hypothesize that Appropriations newcomers will become less 
6 Fermo, Power af the Purse, pp. 213-214. Fermo made no effort to determine 
whether or not this change showed up in member voting behavior outside the com-
mittee. 
7 Manley, The Politics of Finance, Chapter 3. Some observers, most notably 
Al Ullman, the present chairman of the Committee, have attributed the growing 
conservatism of some Democratic members to their experience on Ways and Means. 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 32 (December 7, 1974), pp. 3248-49. 
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party conscious as they assimilate Committee norms, whereas those 
added to Ways and Means should show less change. 8 
Although both Fenno and Manl ey imply at points that both these 
norms ,are relevant primarily to internal decision-making, it seems un-
likely rthat new members could entirely compartmentalize the impact of 
learning norms with such over-arching tdeological implications. 9 For 
example, it seems improbable that liberal Democrats joining Appropri-
ations could become conservative in handling the Federal bud get in 
committee and remain consistently liber al in floor votes. Similarly, habits 
of nonpartisanship engendered within committee might well result in 
gene:rialized declines in party loyalty . Titis paper attempts to provide 
some evidence supporting the existence of such "carry-over" effect. 
Procedure 
To explore the possibility that committee socialization may have 
differential impacts on legislators' overall voting record, at least in these 
committees, this paper focuses on new members ,added to Appropria-
tions and Ways and Means from the mid-1950's through 1968. The 
Congressional Quarterb/s Conservativ e Coalition (CC) and Party Unity 
(PU ) scores constitute the major source of data on voting behavior used 
here. Although CQ's Federal Role score formerly calculated would also 
be useful, it is not available for th e entire period and was frequently 
based on a rather narrow ran ge of votes. Thus, the Conservative Coali-
tion score is used ,as a preferable indicator of conservatism-liberalism. 10 
In asmuch as the CQ studi es are not bas ed on a fixed underlying 
continuum, with ,a true zero point, it was deemed inadvisable to use the 
raw scores on Conservative Coalition and Party Unity voting. The major 
problem involves the intuitive meaning of a num erical score. For exam-
ple, a Democratic member's twenty per cent support for the Conserva-
tive Coalition one year might be a relatively conservative position vis-
a-vis the House Democratic average, wh ereas it might actu ally be more 
s Fenno, Power of the Purse, pp. 164-65; Manley, Politics of Finance, pp. 64-65. 
9 For Fenno's implication that the learning process affects _primarily attitudes 
toward "money matt ers," see Power of the Purse, 213 . Cf. Manley, Politics of Fi-
nance, pp . 68-70. 
lo CQ's Party Unity score is based on th e percentag e of times a party member 
votes with a majority of his party on roll calls in whi ch a majority of Democrats op-
poses a majority of Republicans . The Party Opposition score is the percent age of 
times a party member votes in disagre ement with the majority of his party. Failure 
to vote lowers both Party Unity and Party Opposition scores. Both scores are used 
here as a means of checking the possibl e impli cations of non-voting for appar ent 
changes in party regularity. The Conservative Coalition support and opposition 
scores are based on roll calls in which the majority of voting Republi cans and the 
majority of Southern Democrats oppose the majority of North ern Democrat s. 
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liberal in the following year. As a result, trends indicated by raw scores 
are not particularly reliable. 
To acquire usable data, the author has adopted a different strategy. 
Trends in voting behavior have been measured by the deviation of in-
dividual scores from overall party and group means. Assume, for in-
stance, the following hypothetical series of CC scores for a Northern 
Democrat: 
1965 1966 1967 1968 
cc .......... . . . . . . . . 20% 13% 18% 10% 
Mean for Northern Democr:ats 20% 15% 22% 26% 
Individual Deviation from 
Northern Democratic Mean .... 0 -2 -4 -16 
This is a clear illustration of •a congvessman becoming steadily more 
liberal in comparison with the average Northern Democrat. In this 
fashion, annual scores for new members of both Committees were cal-
culated for their years in Congress. Then, the mean score ( deviation) 
for new members before and after joining each committee was calcu-
lated for Conserv ,ative Coalition Support, Conservative Coalition Oppo-
sition, Party Unity, and Opposition to Party. In this fashion, members 
were identified as becoming more or less conservative and more or less 
party-conscious after accession to Committee membership. In addition, 
the mean changes in ideological and party orientation were also calcu-
lated as a check on the magnitude of the directional shifts. 
Findings: The Democrats 
The expected differences between Democratic addees to Appro-
priations and Ways and Means do appear in changes in Conservative 
Coalition voting. Table I. provides a brief summary of these changes. 
The Conservative Coalition support scores indicate that Appropria-
tions members shift decisively toward a more conserv ative overall ori-
entation after committee service. Not only do most members become 
more conservative, but the average movement is rather substantial. The 
CC support tabulation, on the other hand, reveals very little change in 
Ways and Means Democrats, who retain most of their pre-appointment 
liberal proclivities. The CC opposition scores provide added evidence 
that Appropriations Democrats grow more conservative, but they indi-
cate that Ways and Means Democrats also adopt more conservative 
habits. That the Ways and Means group does not provide •additional 
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TABLE I 
Conservative Coalition Voting Among Committee Democrats 
Coalition Support 
More Conservative 
More Liberal 
Appropriations 
No . Mean Change 
16 
5 
(9 .1) 
(5.0) 
Net: ...... . .... 11 ( 5.8) 
More Conservative 
More Libera l .. . 
Net: 
More Conservative 
Coalition Opposition 
Appropriations 
No. Mean Change 
14 
7 
7 
( 12.6) 
(5.8) 
(6.5) 
More Conservative 
Ways and Means 
No. Mean Change 
8 
7 
1 
(7.5) 
( 6.7) 
(0.9) 
More Conservative 
Ways and Means 
No. Mean Change 
9 
6 
3 
(11.9) 
( 4.4) 
( 5.4) 
More Conservative 
positive support for the Coalition suggests that the net decline of oppo-
sition to the Conservative Coalition largely reflects roll calls missed by 
busy Ways ,and Means members. In any case, the relative changes in 
conservative voting among members of each committee do confo1m to 
earlier expectations . 
Which Democratic members contribute most to the conservative 
movement? As Table II reveals, the most dramatic rise in conservatism 
occurs among Northern liberal Democrats, primarily those on Appro-
priations . 
Northern Democrats become much more conservative on Appropriations 
and slightly more conservative on Ways and Means, taking both the 
direction and magnitude of changes into account. Among Southern Dem-
ocrats no substantial ideological shifts appear, with the possible excep-
tion of a decline in opposition to the Conservative Coalition among Ways 
and Means Democrats. As noted earlier, it seems unlikely that this drop 
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TABLE II 
Conservatism and Regional Scores Committee Democrats 
Northern Democrats 
Coalition Support 
Appropriations 
No. Mean Change 
More Conservative 14 (9.6) 
More Liberal .. . .... 2 (3.4) 
Net Change: .. . ..... 12 (7.9) 
More Conservative 
Coalition Opposition 
Appropriations 
No. Mean Change 
More Conservative 12 
More Liberal . . . . . . . 4 
( 13.6) 
(7 .5) 
Net Change: 8 (8.3) 
More Conservative 
Southern Democrats 
Coalition Support 
Appropriations 
No. Mean Change 
More Conservative . . 2 (5.8) 
(6.2) More Liberal 3 
Net Change: 1 ( 1.4) 
More Liberal 
Coalition Opposition 
Appropriations 
No. Mean Change 
More Conservative 2 
More Liberal . . . . . . . 3 
(6.6) 
(3.6) 
Net Change: 1 ( .5) 
Liberal C onseroative 
Waysand Means 
No. Mean Change 
5 (6.0) 
3 (6.8) 
2 ( 1.2) 
More Conservative 
Ways and Means 
No. 
4 
4 
0 
Mean Change 
( 16.6) 
( 4.8) 
(5.9) 
More Conservative 
Ways and Means 
No. Mean Change 
3 
4 
(9.9) 
(6.6) 
1 ( .5) 
Liberal Conservative 
Ways and Means 
No. Mean Change 
5 
2 
( 8.1) 
(3.6) 
3 ( 4.8) 
More Conservative 
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reflects real changes in perspective, in the absence of corresponding in-
creases in active Coalition support. Nevertheless, among liberal North -
erners large voting shifts are appar ent on Appropriations and, to a lesser 
extent, on Ways and Means. 
Tthe respective Appropriations and Ways and Means Committee 
norms relating to ideology do seem to influence the general voting be-
havior of members. Does a similar "carry-over" of the contrasting par-
tisan norms also take place? The figures in Table III indicat e that it does. 
More Unity 
Less Unity 
More ,Unity 
Less Unity 
. .. . ... 
TABLE III 
Democrats and Party Unity 
Party Unity 
Appropriations 
No. Mean Chan ge 
6 
17 
(2.5) 
( 8.9) 
11 (5.9) 
L ess Party Unity 
Party Opposition 
Appropriations 
No. Mean Change 
8 ( 3.6) 
... .. .. . .. 14 ( 8.4) 
6 (3.9) 
Less Party Unity 
Ways and Means 
No. M ean Change 
7 
19 
( 10.7) 
(6.9) 
12 (2 .2) 
Less Party Unity 
Ways and Means 
No. Mean Change 
12 ( 4.1) 
8 (6.0) 
4 ( .1) 
Less More 
The table reveals ,a rather substantial decline in partisan support 
among Appropriations Democrats, together with a smaller decline in 
party voting among Ways and _Means Democrats. This latter decline 
among Ways and Means Democrats disappears in the party opposition 
scores, indicating once more that the trend may be an artifact, at least 
in part, of non-voting. 
Which segments of the Democratic party are affected by these 
trends? Table IV demonstrates that , unlike the case of Conservative 
Coalition voting, the greatest impact of committee membership on party 
regularity occurs runong Southern-not Northern-Democrats, 
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TABLE IV 
Party Unity and Regional Scores: The Democrats 
Northern Democrats 
Party Voting 
Appropriations 
No. Mean Change 
More Unity . . . . . . . . . 5 (2.7) 
Less Unity . . . . . . . . . . 13 ( 7.5) 
Net : ........... ..... 8 (5.0) 
Less PU 
Party Opposition 
Appropriations 
No. Mean Change 
More Unity . . . . . . . . . 8 (3 .6) 
.. 
Less Unity .......... 9 (8.1) 
Net: ....... .. .. . ... 1 (2.5) 
Less PU 
(" 1 no change) 
Southern Democrats 
Party Voting 
Appropriations 
No. Mean Change 
More Unity . . . . . . 1 
Less Unity . . . . . . . . . . 4 
(1) 
( 13.4) 
Net: .......... 3 ( 10.5) 
Party Opposition 
Appropriations 
No. Mean Change 
More Unity . . . . . . . . . 0 
Less Unity . . . . . . . . . . 5 
(0) 
(8.9) 
Net: 5 ( 8.9) 
Less PU 
Ways and Means 
No. Mean Change 
6 (8) 
9 (7.5) 
3 ( 1.3) 
Less PU 
Ways and Means 
No. Mean Change 
7 ( 5.1) 
5 ( 4.6) 
2 (LO) 
More PU 
Ways and Means 
No. Mean Change 
1 
10 
9 
(27.5) 
( 6.4) 
( 3.3) 
Ways and Means 
No. Mean Change 
5 
3 
(2.8) 
( 8.3) 
2 (1.4) 
More Less PU 
116 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Both groups of Appropriations Democrats, responding to the mileu of 
"minimal partisanship," exhibit declining support for their party and 
find themselves in increasingly frequent opposition to party majorities, 
but the Southern Democrats move farthest. The trends on Ways and 
Means indicate a slight lessening of party bonds, but the indicators are 
mixed among both Northern and Southern members. Thus, on both 
crucial sets of committee norms, the data support, or at least do not rule 
out, the hypothesis that "committee-specific" norms may become gen-
eralized and affect overall member voting. Differing post-assignment be-
haviors of Appropriations and Ways and Means Democrats can plausibly 
be explained as the result of socialization into differing "rules of the 
game" within each committee.11 
Discussion and Conclusion 
J obn F. Manley has observed that the internal decision-making 
norms of Congressional committees may pre-ordain the political coali-
tions ,appearing in Congress on issues within their jurisdiction. 12 For 
example, ,the Appropriation Committee's norms of unity and nonpartisan-
ship have traditionally been reflected in the lack of major controversy 
over money bills on the House floor. If similar effects appear in other 
policy areas, committee norms and modes of operation have obvious im-
plications for the structure of Congressional conflict. 
The present findings support further research into committee nom1s, 
as committee socialization appears to affect members' overall voting be-
havior. In this sense, the House may be the product as well as the cre-
ator of its committees. Studies of additional House committees give us 
some further tantalizing hints: the conflict-laden and partisan-oriented 
style of the House Education and Labor Committee may dictate not only 
how its bills are processed on the House floor, but encourage ideologi-
cal stridency and partisan zeal among individual committee members, 
who may already be policy and ideology-oriented when ,assigned to the 
committee. 13 In some cases, however, norms might indeed remain "com-
mittee-specific": ,a recent study of the House Public Works Committee 
revealed that a "party unity" norm applies within the committee and on 
11 The same operations were performed for Re_publicans on both committees, 
but as Fermo and Manley might vredict, there was little evidence of major change 
in either the degree of party regularity or conservatism exhibited by these members. 
Minor post-appointment changes in GOP voting behavior were essentially random 
in direction. 
12 John F. Manley, "The Presrdency, Congress, and National Policy-Making," 
in Cornelius P. Cotter, ed. Political Science Annual, Volume 5 (Indianapolis and 
New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1964), p. 263. 
13Richard F. Fermo, Jr. Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little , Brown 
and Company, 1973), pp. 74-79. 
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committee legislation sent to the House floor,14 but a brief survey of 
party unity scores of several Public Works Democrats by the present 
author failed to disclose any tendency toward greater party voting. If a 
systematic survey of these voting patterns bears out this impression, it 
might indicate that "party unity" can remain primarily an internal deci-
sion-making rule, a norm of behavior confined to th e context of com-
mitte e business. 
Whatever the findings of further committee studies a tantalizing 
point remains: Which individuals are most subject to the socialization 
process and which are most resistant? Previous students of socialization 
in Congressional norms and folkways have discussed several limitations 
on its effectiveness: previous political experience with differing norms, 
high er political ambitions, constituency pressures , and strongly-held po-
litical ideologies. 15 The experience of Appropriations Democrats pro-
vides some evidence on these points. A cursory survey of Democrats 
shifting most on party unity and conservatism scores reveals a number 
of shared characteristics: most come from relatively rural districts, often 
from sections of the Midwest or West settled by Southern migrants; few 
face powerful constituency pressures in the form of large labor unions 
or other liberal lobbies; most are not affiliated with intra-House liberal 
blocs such as the Democratic Study Group , which might provide peer 
group reinforcement of their original liberal orientations and party regu-
laiity; finally, most appear to be House and Committee careerists, ac-
commodating themselves to committee norms and values, waiting to rise 
to a position of leadership within the existing structure. 16 
The deviant cases among Democrats illustrate the factors which 
prompt a member to resist socialization. Most who move against the 
stream of Committee conservatism and lessened partisanship are dearly 
influenced by strongly liberal ( often highly urban) constituencies, hopes 
for higher partisan political office, and in a few cases, by considerable 
previou s political experience. Although information on intra-House af-
filiations is lacking , at least some are also active in non-committee net-
works which compete with and reduce the effectiveness of committee 
socialization mechanisms. 
A final caution is in order. Recent changes in Congressional opera-
tions may require major shifts in the focus of socialization reseai·ch. The 
14 Murphy, "Political Parties and the Porkbarrel," p. 177. 
15 Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World, pp. 102-117; Murphy "Political 
Parties and the Porkbarrel," p. 178. ' 
16 See, for example, the biographies of George E. Shipley, John T. McFall, John 
Slack, Julia B. Hansen, W. R. Hull, and Neal Smith in Michael Barone, Grant 
Ujufusa, and Douglas Matthews, The Almanac of American Politics, 1974 (Boston: 
Gambit, 1973). 
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increasing turnover of membership in the House, the declinin g pre-
rogatives and sanctions of committee leaders , and the growing role of 
subcommittees and their chairman obviously alters the context for com-
mittee socialization. For example, th e Appropri ations Committee has 
seemingly become more liberal as large numbers of new Northern Dem-
ocrats ,are added, apparently beyond th e capacity of the Committee's 
integration mechanism to process , and as the conservative Committee 
leadership is stripped of its power by the Democratic caucus. Similarly, 
the increased size of the Ways and Means Committee , the creation of 
several subcommittees, and the replacement of Wilbur Mills by Al Ull-
man have ,all had substantial impact on the way that panel operates. 
Thus, the results reported here may be primarily of historical interest, 
as committee socialization takes new forms in a rapidly changing Con-
gressional environment. 17 
17 For the changes in the House Appropriations Committee norms, see Aaron 
Wildavsky, The Politics CY/ the Budgetary Process, 2nd ed. ( Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1974), pp . 213-216; for the Ways and Means Committee, see "Ways 
and Means in 1975: No Longer Pre-eminent," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Re-
port, 33 January 10, 1976, pp. 40-44. 
